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This paper (and its continuation) deals with certain probabilistic general-
izations of the classical first-order logic and with the connections between the 
generalizations. To lock for the historical genesis of our subject would mean 
go back to the beginning of the idea of probability, since it would be very 
difficult to draw the historical borderline between the concept of the probability 
and that of the inference by probahility. The latter relationship remained im-
plicit hy the rise of modern symbolic logic and exact theories of prohability. 
Those studies can he considered as new ones which were inspired hy the ideas 
of either the recursion theory or of the model theory and the theory of proha-
hility together and which examine the connections among these ideas hy the 
implements of the latest mathematics. This interdisciplinar topic is very far 
reaching. Roughly speaking, that part of the mathematical logic, whose "prob-
ahilistic generalization" is to he outlined in this paper, belongs to the classical 
model theory. Such generalizations are referred to as "prohahilistic logics" 
(among others). In Section 3 two such concrete generalizations (with identical 
concepts of the model) 'will he referred to. 
Thc term "prohahilistic logic" will he uscd with several different meanings 
on this paper. (This procedure is natural and inevitable, since there is no uni-
fied terminology in this field.) One of its meanings is the heuristie one, other 
meanings correspond to certain well defined logics. Regardless of this ambiguity. 
it was endeavoured to use this term in a natural and at the same time precise 
way. 
The main ,-iew point of the present paper is that of mathematical logic. 
21cvertheless aspects of (the foundation of) the theory of probability seem to 
deserve to be discussed, involving, however, only those parts of the theory of 
probability, which are familiar for a reader of average mathematical erudition. 
The same level is required for understanding the algebraic or measuTc-theoTetic 
aspects (this framework would not be sufficient for the discussion of algorithm-
theOTetic or topological. etc. aspects.). 
In the second paTt of this study, which will be puhlished separately, we 
shall discuss the connectioll of the topic above with the foundation of the theory 
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of probability - among others the logical interpretations of the event algebras, 
the possibilities of substitution and generalization of the cvent algebras by 
the devices of the mathematical logic. 
The present paper is a survey. To my best knowledge no survey has been 
published on this subj ect, however, it is justified by the timeliness of the modern 
mathematical ideas as well as by the numerous results accumulated. Neither 
my results nor the sources of other theorems and definitions will be referred to 
separately. This procedure is justified by the character of this paper. An outline 
will be given rather than a precise treatment. taking the risk of being careless 
at formal issues and at the same time didactic in approaching certain concepts. 
In this relatively short paper the usual "theorem - definition" structure would 
not cope with the aim of being understandable for others than specialists. For 
more details see References as well as the Doctoral Thesis hy the author, the 
latter containing precise refercnces on the author's own results. 
Section 1 deals \\,-ith the probabilistic generalization of the concepts of 
the first order logic of the classical syntactic systcm, Section 2 \vith the classical 
semantic system. After introducing a concept of the model, Section 3 examine 
two types of the "probability logic". 
1. An approach from the viewpoint of the classical syntactics 
The first and perhaps the most classic approach to our subject is the fol-
lowing: How can the axiomatic method, one of the foundations of the mathe-
maticallogic be generalized into probabilistic direction? More generally: How 
can the concept of the theory - as a category of the mathematical logic -
be generalized? 
The heuristic answer will be given according to the terminology of the 
syntactical system of the classical logic. The essence of the classical axiomatic 
method is the following. 
'Ve give certain formulae (axioms) and we deduce theorems from them 
by applying the rules of inference of the logic; one part of the formulae in the 
given language can be considered as the theorcms of the given system of 
axioms, another part as the undecidahle formulae. The first and natural idea 
of the probabilistic generalization is to build on the classical first order logic; 
i.e. to use its results instead of building "in itself" a "probahility logic." 
Now a real number between 0 and 1 will be assigned to each formula. 
This real number will be (the measure of) the prohability. It is a natural require-
ment to assign the same number to logically equivalent formulae (relative to 
the given system of axioms); to assign number 1 to the theorems. Further, 
additivity is required for logically inconsistent formulae: cp and 'If i.e. if 1 (cp 1\ 1p) 
is a theorem. (Finally, if lp I- cp holds, then the probability of cp has to be great-
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er than or equal to the probability of 1jJ, - as a consequence of earlier require-
ments.)1 Thus, from a certain point of view, the corresponding concepts of 
the classical rules of inference will be the properties required from the probabil-
ityabove. 2 
To every classical system of axioms a logical theory can be assigned: 
the set of formulae deducible from the axioms. Assigning 1 or 0 to a formula 
when it is a theorem or its negation in the system of axioms, respectively, or 
even not assigning any probability to a formula otherwise, a correspondence 
is created between 0 and 1 in the one hand and a set of formulae on the other 
hand; a correspondence satisfying the requirements for probability. 
Since the concept of the theory in the sense of the mathematical logic is 
more general than that defined by the classical system of axioms (e.g. it can 
be defined as a subset of formulae of the language closed with respect to 
deduction; in the case of a consistent theory it is also true that a formula or 
its negation is either a theorem of the theory or is undecidable) leaving aside 
the framework provided by the classical axiomatic method; in the generalization 
of the concept of theory similarly to the defining axioms cannot and need not be 
referred at the requirements on probabilities; the term e.g. "relative equivalence 
with respect to a theory" or "theorem of a theory", etc. can be used instead. 
To provide the probabilistie generalization of the concept of the theory a 
technical pair of concept is needed: that of the basic Lindenballm algebras and 
the relative Lindenballm algebra with respect to a theory. A consistent theory is 
known to define all equiyalence relation (relative logical equivalence with 
respect to this theory) Oil the set of formulae of the language: and a Boolean 
structure can he introduced ou the set of equivalence classes ohtained ahove. 
For example. the theorems of the theory form the unit element of this Boolean 
algehra; the class consisting of the conjnction of the formulae defining the 
individual classes is the product of the respective elements, etc. This Boolean 
algehra is called the Lincleuhaum algebra helonging to the language and rela-
tive to the corresponding theory. If the theory is the set of the tautologies. 
then the relative algebra itself is the so-called basic Lindenbaum algebra of the 
language. Then the concept of the theory can be generalized as a probability on 
the relative Lindenbaum algebra /I;ith respect to the corresponding theol),. Thus we 
get hack the prohahilistie generalization of the theory for those special theories 
which are defined hv axioms. 
Remark: For the concept of the theory can he giyen a different prohahility 
generalization, hased on the following fact: Eyery consistent theory induces 
a 0 -1 measure on the suhalgehra of its hasic Lindenhaum algehra hy assign-
1 Concerning the assumption or negation of the additivity as property of the probability, 
see in [4]. But in the framework of the present paper, the acceptance of the additiyity is natural 
like of the other usual axioms of the prohability. 
2 Using the concept of deducibility the rules of inference of the logic are implicitly 
assumed. Thus the requirements for the probability are not intended to substitute them. 
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ing I to the classes representing the theorems and 0 to the classes representing 
the negation of the theorems, since the classes representing the theorems and 
their negations of the theory form a suhalgehra. Generalizing this concept, a 
theoTY can be defined as a probability on any sub algebra of the basic Linden-
baum algebra. 
This definition differs from the earlier one by the following facts: confin-
ing our attention to the classical axiomatic method, the definition it allo'ws 
probabilities less than 1 for axioms: it does not assign prohahility to every for-
mula; it does not rely directly on the concq)t of theory of the first order logic. 
The introduction of a suhalgehra lllay lllean closedness with respect to a clas-
sical concept of inference. 
It is easy to modify our discussion ahoye and helow for this generalization 
of the concept of theory. Thc generalization outlined originally seems to he 
more appropriate from the points of yiew of principle and praetice, hut there 
is no reason to stand up for the first or seermd generalization, hecause both 
definitions can be proyen to he essentirJly reducible to the examination of prob-
ability defined on the entire basic Lindenhaum algebra. 
The concept of inference is one of thf~ basic concepts of thc logic. Et'ery 
consistent theOT} induces a concept of relative consequence, with the folIo'wing 
semantical approach; regarding of the concept (If the corresponding consequence 
only those models are to hc taken into accnunt 'which are already the models 
of the corresponding theory. The concept of the non-relatiye conscquence can 
be considered as onc induced by the trivial theory of the lngically deducible 
formulae, i.e. the tautology. As the probahilistic generalization of the foregoing 
let us consider the prohability on relatiye Lindenhaum algebra, generalizing a 
theory. The probability of inference by this theory i.f'. the probability of .. !f! 
implies 'I"; denoted hy c(q', It') can lit' measured hy the number m(r{!\!f!);m(v,), 
assuming m(lp) "~ 0 (where the yalues m assigned directly to the formulae are 
defined by the prohahility defined on the ~'datiye Lindenbaulll algebra). 
This is equiyalent to the definition of th(~ conditional prohability well 
kno'wn from the th;'ory of probahility - we shall g') hack to its logical inter-
pretation. For the latt(~r the clas»icallogical semantical approach will he more 
appropriate, completed by the aaalysis of the relationship 
the well-known principle of multiplieation. v,-hich contains the conditional 
prohahility hut cn'oids the division. 
(Remark: The concept of infercnce by pl'Ohability can he defined on an 
arbitrary set of formulae.) 
It is known that a consistent theory defines a concept of conseqltence and 
L'ice rersa [21; 7.9], i.e. a binary relation defiu(;cl on all formulae, with appro-
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priate properties (supplying the concept of relative consequence 'If' I rp) defines 
a theory, thus it defines a relative Lindenbaum algebra "\vith respect to a theory 
just mentioned and an ordering on it. 
Generalizing the foregoing, assigning a probability with prescribed prop-
perties (see [3]) to the "V~ implies (T" in the sense of the foregoing ordering for 
every pair rp, lp (except if lp is a theorem) a real correspondence is created 
het"ween the pairs of elements of the relative Boolean algebra defined above 
and the real interval [0, 1] - H'hich generalizes the concept of consequence, and 
indirectly, also an ordinary probability defined on the Boolean algebra is 
created - generalizing the concept of theory. 
We remind the reader of the introduction of the conditional probability 
fields, well known from the theory of prohability; which at the same time 
defines a non-conditional probahility field [4]. In a certain sense not yet defined 
hy us, these ordinary probability fields can be considered as a prohabilistically 
gelwralized theory; generated by the concept of conditional probability 
fields, which is a certain concept of probabilistic consequence. This analogy 
together with analogies ahove provides an intuitive argument for the naturality 
of such a building up of the "probability logie" in which besides relying on the 
results of the first-order logic, a probabilistically generalized concept of conse-
quence is considered as a start; i.e. inference by probability is its basic concept 
(assigning a given III to the fOTlllulae means to infer b.y probability Ill.) It is 
the contrary of the procedure outlined first, based on the concept of the logi-
cal theory. Therefore the basie coneept of the inference by probahility is the 
funetion defined on the ordered pairs of the elements of the relath:e algebra, 
of a range of inten'als [0, 1]. with usually five requirements [4]. 
Remark: The latter construction historically preceded the former one; 
it i" due to Carnap [3]. who introduced the conditional probability discussed 
aboyc on the "relatiye" algebra with respect to the triyial theory and called 
it logical probability: the descripth-c probability function was referred to as 
confirmation function and his theory as the theory of inductive logic. Perhaps 
it is not by accident that he, as a philosopher, has chosen this construction 
for his theory, emphasizing the basic property of the concept of probability 
to he essentially conditional. 
The construction outlined aboye is due to Gaifman. Scott, Krauss, 
among others [10], [24), [16]. 
In the ordinary logic, certain logically consistent sentences determine 
uniquely the deducibility of certain formulae and the undeeidability of others 
in the given system of axioms - i.e. these sentences uniquely determine 
a theory. Howeyer, if concrete probabilities are given on certain formulae 
(i.e. on classes of equivalent formulae), where the prohabilities satisfy the rules 
of prohability, then a positive result on the set of those formulae for which 
the probahility can he extended uniquely, is known only in special eases. For 
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example: if a probability is defined on every quantifier-free sentence, then 
it can be extended - under certain restrictions - to the set of sentences 
with quantifiers. 
To get concrete probability values for a well-manageable and very big 
set of the formulas, of course there is another possibility (besides the first 
possibility, just mentioned): to put further requirement on the concept of 
probability. Such a requirement for example is as follows: For a language 
with identity and for all different individual symbols a and b it is a require-
ment that the probability of formula a = b be o. (Probability with strict 
identity.) The larger the set of the requirements on probability, the narrower 
the class satisfying them. A sufficiently high number of requirements produces 
a concrete probability for every formula. In other words: W"e can infer by a con-
crete probability (we can use a concrete "inductive method"). 
Remark: It was also Carnap, who, following the lines above .. enounced 
those probabilistic axioms under which the well-defined special distribution-
family (called continuum of inductive methods) is applicable. 
By the way, perhaps the highlight of Carnap's whole work is the follow-
ing: While the theory of probability had long been surrounded hy a bit of 
mystery, even today it is often not accepted as pure mathematics, only as ap-
plied mathematics, together with heuristics). Carnap' s construction consistently 
endeavours to maximal exactness of mathematical logic. Carnap not only 
restored the theory of probahility as a pure science (this had already been 
done) but he raised it to the rank of a logical theory (the term "inductive 
logic" partly refers to this fact) centered around the concept of "inference by 
prohability", the so-called "inductive inference". 
2. An approach from the view point of the classical semantics 
Let us approach the concepts outlined ahove from the side of the seman-
tical system rather than from the syntactical one of the classical logic. 
Suppose to have a general first-order language. In the classical logic 
·we are interested (among others) in the following question: Considering a 
fixed model, "where certain formulae (axioms and hypotheses) are true .. do 
they imply the truth of another prefixed formula? 
More precisely: Is the conclusion true in ever~v model·where the hypotheses 
are true? In other words: Is the conclusion (or negation) on the hypotheses 
valid or not? 
The concept of the probability assigned to the formulae by classical 
semantical way will generalize the classical concept of inference. For example: 
in the case of closed formulae if neither the conclusion nor its negation are 
implied by the hypotheses, our concept pro\icles the "prohahility" of the 
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inference, namely: the degree by which "the hypotheses are true" implies 
"the conclusion (or its negation) is true" _ In other words: choosing a model at 
random from models where the hypotheses are true, what is the probabilit)r that 
the conclusion is true? 
Examine the correctness of this description and for a while forget about 
the syntactical approach to the probability (used till now) assigned to the 
formulae. 
Consider a consistent set of sentences .J and all its possible models. 
The meaSllre (probability) assigned to each closed formula by (classical) 
semantical way is meant as real assignment of range [0, I] on the set of the 
closed formulae with the following requirements. (Since there is a one to one 
natural correspondence between certain classes of models and the formulae, 
it is sufficient to define our assignment on these classes of models.) 
Measure I is assigned to the class of models L1 (i.e. also to formulae 
valid in this class of models): the sum of the measures to disjoint classes of 
models (i.e. the sum of the measures of the disjunction terms to the disjunc-
tion of logically inconsistent sentences with respect to .J). Further, if the 
class of model of a sentence contains that of another sentence (with respect 
to cd) tht'n the probahility of the first sentence is greater than or equal to 
that of the second one. (This property is already implied by the former require-
ments.) 
Since tht'se classes of models of the closed formulae form a class (or set) 
algebra on the class of models cd (see below), the measure above assigned to these 
classes of models or formulae can be considered as defined by the probability 
defined on this class algebra. 
Our definition is in accordance with the fact (also referring to the syntac-
tical approach to the probability) that the class algebra above is isomorphic 
to the relative Lindenbaum algebra of all sentences with respect to Ll. Therefore 
the semantical approach to the concept of probability assigned to the formulae 
is on accordance with the definition of the probability above built upon the 
syntactical system. 
The semantical interpretation of the probability assigned to the closed 
formulae can be approached even in a more general and very important way. 
We start from an arbitrary class of models among those corresponding 
to the type of a given language (i.e. our model class may differ from the class 
of models of a given consistent set of sentences). 
Probability assigned to closed formulae is heuristic ally meant as the prob-
ability of choosing from these classes of models at random a model which 
satisfies the given formula. 3 One can give an exact definition in a way similar 
3 To use a terminology closer to the theory of probability, if the given model class rep-
resents the "possible, realizable models", and our model results at random, by what prob-
ability we can consider the corresponding formula as true in advance. 
i Periodica Polytechnics. El. 22/ !!-3. 
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to the case above (when the set of models L1 was the basic class of models). 
Here we have to take into account that those subclasses of the given class 
of models ·which consist of models satisfying the corresponding sentence of 
the language also form a class algebra. In the latter case the relative Linden-
baum algebra of all sentences of the language with respect to the theory of the given 
class of models is the "language-image" of the foregoing class algebra (see: 
also below). 
(Remark: In Section 1 probability was assigned to formulae in connection 
·with the syntactical concept of theory. Its semantical equivalent is as follows: 
The theory of a class of models is known to mean the set of sentences 
which are true for each element of this class of models; i.e. a theory induces 
a correspondence between a subset of the formulae and {O, I}. As a proba-
bilistic generalization of the semantical concept of theory a number is assigned 
to every sentence; again 1 to the formulae belonging to th(' theory of the model 
class, 0 to their negations, and an arbitrary probability to the remaining 
sentences. As already mentioned because of isomorphism. this correspondence 
can be considered as a probability distribution on the relative Lindenbaum 
algebra with respect to the given theory - in accordance with the syntactical 
generalization of the concept of theory.) 
Continuing the ordinary logical semantical approach to the probability 
assigned to the formulae the generalization of the concept of inference can be 
interpreted as a real number C(cp,lp) expressing the probability of choosing 
a model at random satisfying cp from the models satisfying "If)' Its numerical 
relation (c(cp, JP») to the ordinary probability m introduced in this Section can 
be explained easily on the relation m(q: 1\ 1p) = c(cp,1p) . m(1p). 
Indeed, the problem of choosing a model satisfying hoth lp and q: from 
a given class of models is solved hy checking first the truth of 11'; then that 
of cp, when 1p was true. The left-hand side of our equation is the probability 
of the success of the simultaneous check, the right-hand side is the product 
of the prohahility of the success of the first check by the conditional :::uccess 
of the second one. Therefore c(cp, 11') can be defined as in Section l. 
(Remark: One can also explain by semantical way the fact that while 
1p cp and ~) ~ cp are equivalent in the ordinary logic c(cp, ~,) generally dif-
fers from m("If! -+ cp). 
Until now the meaning of the probability assigned to the closed formulae 
has been dealt with. Probability was, however, also assigned to the open for-
mulae through the syntactical system, hence it calls for a semantical explana-
tion. The following heuristic explanation has an exact form, too [18]: 
Let us interpret the probability assigned to an open formula as the proba-
bility of choosing a model satisfying a formula if it was chosen from a prefixed 
class of models and the valuations of the individual variables were chosen at 
random in this model. 
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Thus, while for closed formulae it is sufficient to define the probability on a 
class algebra corresponding to the prefixed set of sentences, for open formula we 
need yet define for each model, the probahility of valuation of individual variables 
satisfying the given formula has still to he defined. The latter is a probability 
family. Namely, it holds (see [18] for details), that for every probability distri-
bution defined on the open formulae, there exists a probability family such 
that, jointly with the restriction of the original probability to the closed for-
mulae, it determines uniquely the extension to the open formulae. Its reverse 
also holds: The prohahility defined on the closed formulae and the probability 
family determine uniquely an extension to the open formulae. (That is, the 
probability assigned to the open formulae may in fact have the following 
meaning: What is the probability of receiving a valuation satisfying a formula 
by choosing a model from the prefixed class of models at random by a distri-
bution "\vhich extends the distrihution defined on the closed formulae and 
choosing the valuation of the indi-..idual variables on a model at random by 
another distribution?) 
One can give the "semantical images" of the entire Lindenhaum algebras 
(containing the open formulae too) - in parallel to the relation between the 
Lindenbaum algebras of the closed formulae and the class algebras of the 
corresponding classes of models [21]. 
3. Prohability logic 
This Section outlines the construction and interpretation of the prob-
ahilistic generalization of the ordinary first-order logic as a logical system. 
Our aim was to build upon the classical logic. Section 1 outlined the 
generalization of a few concepts of the syntactical system of the classical 
logic in a relative form with respect to a theory, referring to the corresponding 
concepts of the rule of inference, theory, concept of consequence, to the prob-
abilistic analogue on the fact that a relative logic can be build up on the 
concept of the theory as well as on the concept of the relative consequence, 
involving the following question: Is there an analogue of the axiomatizability 
of a theory, or of the fact that certain consistent assertions uniquely deter-
mine a theory in the classical logic ? 
The following remark is closely connected with the latter question: 
while the deducihility of assertions determined the deducibility of sentential 
combinations in the classical logic, the probabilities of assertions do not deter-
mine in general the probahilities of the sentential combinations in the prob-
abilistic logic. There exists, however, a simple condition under which the prob-
abilities of all the quantifier-free closed formulae determine the probabilities 
of the closed formulae with quantifier, and the determining relation is simple, 
7* 
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too. It is also possible to state interesting relationships between the probabil-
ities of closed and of open formulae [10]. 
The correspondence between a problem given in the theory of probability 
in common parlance and an exact logical theorem (with its hypotheses and 
consequence) in the theory of inference by probability can be illustrated by 
an example [3] using the concepts of the probabilistic logic introduced above. 
Section 2 referred to the classic semantical background of the probabi-
listic generalizations of the concepts of the classic syntactical system mentioned 
just above (but not to the probabilistic logical semantics to be discussed below). 
Now, the semantical part of the probabilistic logic will be considered. 
The simplest way to obtain the concept of the so called "probability model" 
(in a different terminology: probability system) is to generalize the Boolean 
algebra models [15] 'with identity. The "relations" in this latter are known 
to be defined as functions (of finite arguments) from the universum into the 
complete Boolean algebra. (Of course, the corresponding Boolean algebra 
may vary from model to model.) 
If the Boolean algebra representing the range of the truth values is the 
two-element algehra, ,ve are hack at the concept of the ordinary relational 
system. 
Now the prohabilistic generalization is as follows: Probability on the 
Boolean algehras representing the truth values is defined. The Boolean 
models thus generalized will be referred to as "probability models". The valua-
tion of the formulae of the ordinary first-order language on these "probability 
models" is perfectly similar to the valuations in Boolean models (relying on 
Tarski's idea) except the following modification: now real numbers are assigned 
to the formulae by the probabilities assigned to the Booleall elements. To 
explain these definitions and to answer the question: - Why to assign real 
numbers to the formulae probability? - We mention the following arguments: 
In the case of an infinite language a probability model in fact induces a prob-
ability Oil the basic Lindenbaum algebra of the language extended with 
symbols corresponding to the elements of the basic set of the model [4]. In 
this connection, the probability model and the valuation seem to be quite 
natural probabilistic generalizations of the classical relational systems. One 
can, however, construct a model and a concept of valuation well known from 
the so-called Continuous Model Theory [5]: Also this construction assigns real 
numbers between zero and one to the formulae of the first-order predicate 
language, and the logic (defined by this assignment) is also the generalization 
of the first order one; nonetheless the real assignment to these formulae has 
nothing to do \'tith any concept of probability. 
4 a-additivity from the Boolean algebra of the range and positiyity from the probability 
are required - which jointly provide the completeness of the Boolean algebra. 
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Thus the reference to the attribute "probability" of the model above is 
correct as a first approximation. 
In the ordinary logic a set of consistent sentences always has a model, 
moreover, if it has an infinite model then it has a countable one (Lowenheim-
Skolem theorem). 
Its equivalent also holds in the probahilistic logic. The theorem ·will be 
generalized in the form concerning consistent theOl·ies. The probability on the 
basic Lindenhaum algebra will be considered rather than that on the relative 
Lindenbaum algebra. (The latter is the prohabilistic generalization of the 
concept of the theory.) As mentioned. this replacement is feasible. 
Let us state the following : A probability model is a model of the proba-
bility defined on the basic Lindenballm algebra of the language if the probabilities 
on the former and the latter are the same on the closed formulae of the language. 
Now we haye the following theorem: Every prohability defined on the 
formulae of the language has a prohability model. more oyer it always has a 
countable model, too. It has even such special models as a symmetrical model 
or one ·which has a strict identity [24]. 
The last sentence inyoh-ed two concepts: 
A prohability model is referred to as s.vmmetrical if the probability of 
the formulae are "iuyariant to all the permutations of the constants of the 
language -'. 
A IIlodel is referred to as having strict identity if it assigns zero probability 
to the formula a = b provided a .~ b. 
Otherwise_ the syntactical equivalents of these specifications ha ye already 
been tackled with. 
Remark 1: A 0 -1 measure defined by an ordinary complete and con-
sistent theory has a symmetrical probability model and another one having 
a strict identity. 
Remark 2: For the so-called infinite languages it does not hold that 
the prohahility defined on a basic Lindenbaum algebra always has a proba-
bility model. 
Similarly to considering an ordinary relational system as a special prob-
ability model (looking for their place in the set of all the probability models), 
other important probability models of special types may also be studied. While 
the probability is maximally concentrated on the numbers 0 and 1 for the 
classical relational systems it is diametrically opposite for the symmetrical 
systems mentioned ahove, for which the probability is distributed very uni-
formly on the formulae. 
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Concerning the systems having strict identity only the following remark 
is made: There are a lot of very important probability system (e.g. the equiva-
lents of the ultraproducts) which have not strict identities. Consequently, "to 
have strict identity" may be considered as an individual property. 
As for as the most fundamental semantical constructions of the model 
theory are concerned, the theory has succeeded in finding their probabilistic 
logical equivalents for their majority, but did not succeed for minority. For 
example: one can givc the probabilistic logical equivalents of the following 
concepts: submodel, elementary submodel, elementary equivalence, llltraprodllct, 
but it is impossible for the direct product to give a counter-example. 
Considering the corresponding concepts of the concepts of classical syn-
tactical systems in the probahilistic logic as outlined above, the concept of 
axiom, theory, relative consequence (of two argument) are seen to have been, 
hy an essential degree, though retaining the usual meaning of the formula. 
Next step in the further probabilistic generalization of the ordinary logic 
(relying on the previous results) is to introduce a generalized concept of the 
formula, the so-called "probability assertion". This step is considered as final 
in the generalizations of this paper. In this generalization it 'was aimed at 
getting such a logic whose general status is even more close to that of the classical 
one. 
As a matter of fact, the concept of "probability assertion" corresponds 
to that of the formula of the sententiallogic. The introduction of this concept 
of the formula is analogous to the procedure by which the syntactics in the 
Boolean models can be considered (among others) as means to symbolize the 
operations on the Boolean algebras representing thc range of the truth values 
hence, to manipulate the Boolean elements and the truth values in this sense. 
Similarly to the syntactics of every logical system, aiming at describing a defi-
nite discipline, for the probability models the truth values are probabilities, 
i.e. real numbers between 0 and 1. Therefore a (n auxiliary) language appro-
priate for the manipulation of the real numbers is needed. By definition, a 
"probability assertion" of a first order language is meant as (N + l)-tuple 
ft = (1jJ,1jJl' 1jJ2 , •• • 1jJN) ,,"-here IjJ is a quantifier-free formula with N free varia-
hIes of a so-called algebraic language, and 1jJl' If'2' ... , lI'N are arbitrary closed 
formulae of the original language 'E).5 (An algebraic language contains countable 
individual variable, the binary predicate constant <, the individual constants 
0, +1, I, the function symbols of two-argument and -, and the logical 
constants 1\, V, l, V, 3·) 
5 Thus this definition is not a recursive one. 
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The assertion .fj is said to hold on a probability model (of an appropriate 
type) if the N-tuple m("Pl)' m("P2)' .... m('PN) satisfies "P on the ordinary model 
<Re, <, +, . ,0, 1, -I) (where m denotes the probability defined on the 
given model and Re is the set of the real numbers). 
Now the corresponding semantical concepts are ready to be introduced 
in the logic belonging to this probability model. For example: we say that 
a probahility assertion .fj is a consequence of a set of probability assertions 1::; if 
.fj holds on every such probahility model where all the elements of E hold. 
(Thus, a terminology of this logic has heen created, close to that of the clas-
sical one; the "formulae" are merely true or not in a modellike in the ordinary 
logic, in contrary to the probability generalizations of the ordinary logic up 
to now, "where the formulae in their ordinary meaning hold only "\vith a certain 
probahility. Thus one can construct further terminologies similar to that of 
the semantics of the ordinary logic.) 
Contrary to the semantics, of the logic discussed in this Section it is 
somewhat difficult to find the properties corresponding to the tautology or 
the deducibility, though an experiment has heen made to solve this prohlem 
[24]. 
Scott and Krauss [24] also provide the answer to the question: What 
is the connection between the semantics and syntactics outlined ahovp aDd 
what are mathematical dp,.jces applicahle for its examination. 
Summary 
A generalization of the classic first-order logic "into probabilistic direction" with the 
devices of modern mathematics is presented. The generalization of the concepts belonging to 
the classical model theory has only recourse to exact mathematical tools. 
The discussion involves the possibilities of the probabilistic generalizations of the axio-
matic method, and the concept of logical theory with probability, the equivalents of rules of 
inference in such a theory; the concepts of -'inference by probability" and "inference by a 
concrete probability". the meaning of "inference in a random model"; what is the background 
of the conditional probability ill the "mathematical logic": the construction of an exact logic 
discipline on such concepts analogous to the theory of probability. 
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